Cogito: We usually begin with a biographical question, and perhaps this is especially appropriate in your case, since After Virtue is so concerned with ideas of a quest and of a narrative of a life. What would you emphasize in your own 'narrative'? MacIntyre: Any adequate narrative of my life would have to emphasize a radical change in it around 1971. Before then I had had a number of disparate and sometimes conflicting sets of concerns and beliefs, and I was unable to move decisively towards any resolution either of the problems internal to each particular set of concerns or beliefs or of those which arose from the tensions between them. Both in political philosophy and in political practice I had learned, from Marxism, how to identify the moral impoverishment and the ideological function of liberalism. I had also learned, partly from Marxism and partly from non-Marxist sociology and anthropology, that certain older types of teleologically ordered community were incompatible with the dominant economic and social forms of modernity. But I did not as yet know how to disengage what I had learned from the erroneous and distorting theoretical frameworks, Marxist or Durkheimian, in terms of which I had formulated what I had learned. The work which issued in Secularization and Moral Change (Oxford University Press: London, 1967) had taught me that the moral presuppositions of liberal modernity, whether in its theory or in its social institutions, are inescapably hostile to Christianity and that all attempts to adapt Christianity to liberal modernity are bound to fail. But I did not as yet understand either the philosophical presuppositions of a biblical theism-bound up with the claim that this is a teleologically ordered universe -or the resources tha t the Catholic church has for sustaining its own form of life in antagonistic social environments. least three different kinds of importance. Concepts are embodied in and draw their lives from forms of social practice. To understand how a particular concept is used it has to be located in terms of the activities and norms of some form of established practice. But any practice of any importance has a history. Practices come to be, are sustained and transformed, and sometimes perish as parts of the histories of particular societies. Within such societies the normative and evaluative modes of judgment and action which inform both activity within practices and attitudes to practices have to be handed on from one generation to another. And one aspect of the social embodiment of concepts is their transmission in this way. So to abstract any type of concept, but notably moral concepts, from the contexts of the traditions which they inform and through which they are transmitted is to risk damaging misunderstandings. Secondly, a shared ability to ask and answer together such questions as 'What is our common inheritance from our common past?' 'What should we have learned from our shared experienced to value in it?' and 'What in it is open to criticism and requires remaking?' is one prerequisite for the kind of social life in which the rational discussion of both ends and means, by its continuing elaboration and reformulation of some conception of a common good, provides an alternative both to the mindless conservatism of hierarchies of established power and to fragmentation through the conflicts of group interests and individual preferences, defined without reference to a common good. Thirdly, rational enquiry is itself always tradition-dependent. The best established theories-those which it is rational to accept -in contemporary natural science are not worthy of acceptance because they conform to some timeless set of canons for scientific theories, positivist or otherwise. Some of these are such that not only do their adherents arrive at evaluative and normative conclusions which are incompatible with those of the adherents of some other such systems, but their standards of reasoning are such that from the standpoint of each contending party the reasoning of the other must be judged unsound. The relativist then further observes that in relation to some of these rival contending systems the system of thought and action which she or he espouses is in no different a position. It is up to this point that I agree with the relativist. Where then do I disagree? Relativists universally proceed one stage in 71 the argument beyond this and characteristically two stages. In neither do I accompany them. The first stage is that of supposing that somehow or other these conclusions about the multiplicity of concrete modes of reasoning and of modes of justification for evaluative and normative conclusions provide grounds for putting in question and altering one's view of the justification of one's own reasoning and conclusions. The second is that of supposing that the same considerations should lead to a rejection of the claims of any substantive conception of truth. Neither ofthese stages in the relativist argument is justified and it is of course only by having pursued the argument to this unwarranted point that the relativist lays her or himself open to those types of selfreferential refutation which have so often been deployed against relativism. Cogito: There are so many other questions we could ask about your work, whether relatively detailed and concerning, e.g. your interesting idea of a practice, or more general and concerning, e.g. your contribution to the revival of Aristotle and 'virtue ethics'. Can you offer a question of your own and answer it? MacIntyre: The question which is perhaps the most important that you could put to me is that of how the concept of a practice must be further developed, if it is to be as philosophically fruitful as I hope that it may be. In After Virtue I provided a general characterization of practices and I gestured towards some examples. But a great deal more needs to be said, more particularly in order to throw light on how evaluative concepts and normative concepts have application. Consider how, within the context of at least certain types of practice, shared standards of success and failure make the application of such concepts relatively unproblematic, as, for example, among the crews of a fishing fleet. Their standards of success and fail ure are set by shared goals: to secure a large enough catch between spring and fall to ensure a reasonable income for the whole year; not to overfish the accessible fishing grounds, so as to deprive themselves of their livelihood; not to lose their lives or their boats or their nets; to be able by doing these things to sustain the lives of their families. Two kinds of shared achievement provide the goods internal to this type of practice: that which belongs to the attainment of excellence in the cooperative activity of fishing, the excellence or lack of it of each crew member in playing her or his part contributing to the excellence or lack of it of the whole crew, and that which belongs to the excellence attained in sustaining the lives of the households from which the crew members came and to which they return. The range of uses of 'good' and cognate expressions will be intelligible in terms of the structures of activity of the crew and the household. To be good at this or that aspect of the tasks of fishing requires skills whose utility depend on qualities of character and mind in those who use them, qualities which generally and characteristically enable their possessor, by doing what is required of them on the right occasions, to achieve the goods of both crew and household, for the sake of which all else is done. So 'good at', 'good for', the virtue words, the expressions which appraise performance of duty, and 'good for its own sake' are at once socially and semantically ordered. And the next philosophical task is to spell out these related orderings. When 'good' and its cognates are used intelligibly outside the context of particular practices, it is a presupposition of their use-an Aristotelian presupposition-that human societies as wholes are ordered as practices, wholes of which particular practices, such as fishing or philosophy or cricket, are constituent parts. And here again the ordering of the uses of 'good', as these are socially and semantically structured, is a philosophically urgent task. 
